La revista The Economist (12/o6/2008) tituló su editorial de esta semana The end of illusion and the last guerrilla ("El final de la ilusión y la última guerrilla"), donde señala que ahora si es posible una victoria del gobierno colombiano sobre lass FARC.
Asegura el editorial -traducida en parte por la revista Semana- que los últimos meses el grupo armado esta devastado, por los siguiente s motivos. El primero es que han perdido a tres de los siete miembros del Secretariado, incluido Tirofijo; el segundo, es la deserción de miles de guerrilleros y el tercero es el giro en U del presidente venezolano Hugo Chávez, quien en enero pasado pidió el estatus de fuerza beligerante para las Farc, hace pocos días le dijo al nuevo líder del grupo, Alfonso Cano, que libere a todos los secuestrados y declaró que los movimientos guerrilleros no tienen sentido en la realidad latinoamericana.
El texto afirma que las Farc ya no están en condiciones de destruir la democracia colombiana, pero hay que buscar un salida. The Economist, se plantea un interrogante: “Ahora que la guerrilla ha sido reducida, ¿qué oferta razonable les puede hacer a los líderes guerrilleros el señor Uribe?”. Y califica entonces de muy improbable un acuerdo de paz con los jefes de las Farc pues, dice, ellos no quieren correr la misma suerte que los 14 jefes paramilitares que por su vinculación con el narcotráfico y con delitos de lesa humanidad fueron extraditados recientemente a los EE UU.
The Economist propone que, a cambio de que los líderes de las Farc depongan las armas, el Estado podría darles protección y estimularlos a hacer política sin ninguna ventaja.
Editorial en ingles:
The end of illusion and the last guerrilla
Jun 12th 2008 From The Economist print edition
Jun 12th 2008 From The Economist print edition
A war may be ending in Latin America. But fixing the peace terms will be hard
SIX years ago, Colombians elected Álvaro Uribe as president because he pledged to beef up the security forces to defend a democracy under murderous assault from left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries. Many well-meaning people in the United States, Europe and Latin America wailed that Mr Uribe was a warmonger, and urged him instead to reach a “political solution” with the guerrillas. Military victory against the FARC, the oldest, biggest and wealthiest guerrilla army in Latin America, was impossible, they declared.
Well, it now looks possible. Over the past few months the FARC has suffered a series of devastating blows. It has lost three of the seven members of its ruling secretariat, including Manuel Marulanda, the FARC's 78-year-old founder and undisputed leader, who died of a supposed heart attack. Thousands of fighters have deserted.
Even Hugo Chávez, Venezuela's leftist president, who recently called for the world to recognise the FARC as “legitimate belligerents”, has changed his tune. This week he urged the FARC and its new leader, Alfonso Cano, to end the war and release their 700-or-so hostages. “At this moment in Latin America an armed guerrilla movement is out of place,” Mr Chávez said. Leave aside that Mr Chávez's statement may have been prompted by evidence that seems to tie Venezuela to the guerrillas (see article). Whatever the motive, it is to be hoped that Mr Cano concurs. But what if he doesn't?
Fighting the FARC and seeking a peace deal have never been alternatives. Mr Uribe's predecessor spent three years in fruitless talks, during which the guerrillas made it clear that their aim was to impose communism, making demands for political and socio-economic changes that no democracy could accept, even as they carried on killing and kidnapping. Weakening the FARC militarily has thus always been a necessary condition for achieving a political settlement.
Now that the guerrillas have been reduced, what could Mr Uribe reasonably offer them? Here there is a difficulty. When the right-wing paramilitaries showed interest in a political solution, agreeing to demobilise in return for lenient treatment of their crimes, many of those well-meaning outsiders promptly excoriated Mr Uribe for offering a sweetheart deal to drug-trafficking mass-murderers. Colombia's Supreme Court took a similar view. It put teeth into the law under which the paramilitaries disarmed, requiring them to give a full account of their crimes. But some of the warlords continued to run their criminal rackets while in jail. Last month Mr Uribe extradited 14 of them to the United States, where they face life in prison.
The tough line Colombia has taken with the right-wing warlords makes a peace deal with their left-wing counterparts harder. The FARC's leaders, too, have committed crimes against humanity, and some of them traffic drugs. So they now have little incentive to demobilise. Some Colombians say the best place for the FARC's leaders is jail. That is true, but the best can be the enemy of the good. Though the FARC can no longer destroy Colombia's democracy, fighting to the last guerrilla is in nobody's interest. Ending this conflict will require compromise as well as continued military firmness.
Forgiveness maybe, but no reward
Getting the compromise right will be difficult. It will almost certainly have to include security guarantees for the FARC's leaders. But it should not, as some say, include any offer of power-sharing. Colombia is a democracy. In return for laying down their arms and ending a pointless and destructive war, FARC soldiers should be encouraged to take part in politics, but on exactly the same terms as any other Colombian.
SIX years ago, Colombians elected Álvaro Uribe as president because he pledged to beef up the security forces to defend a democracy under murderous assault from left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries. Many well-meaning people in the United States, Europe and Latin America wailed that Mr Uribe was a warmonger, and urged him instead to reach a “political solution” with the guerrillas. Military victory against the FARC, the oldest, biggest and wealthiest guerrilla army in Latin America, was impossible, they declared.
Well, it now looks possible. Over the past few months the FARC has suffered a series of devastating blows. It has lost three of the seven members of its ruling secretariat, including Manuel Marulanda, the FARC's 78-year-old founder and undisputed leader, who died of a supposed heart attack. Thousands of fighters have deserted.
Even Hugo Chávez, Venezuela's leftist president, who recently called for the world to recognise the FARC as “legitimate belligerents”, has changed his tune. This week he urged the FARC and its new leader, Alfonso Cano, to end the war and release their 700-or-so hostages. “At this moment in Latin America an armed guerrilla movement is out of place,” Mr Chávez said. Leave aside that Mr Chávez's statement may have been prompted by evidence that seems to tie Venezuela to the guerrillas (see article). Whatever the motive, it is to be hoped that Mr Cano concurs. But what if he doesn't?
Fighting the FARC and seeking a peace deal have never been alternatives. Mr Uribe's predecessor spent three years in fruitless talks, during which the guerrillas made it clear that their aim was to impose communism, making demands for political and socio-economic changes that no democracy could accept, even as they carried on killing and kidnapping. Weakening the FARC militarily has thus always been a necessary condition for achieving a political settlement.
Now that the guerrillas have been reduced, what could Mr Uribe reasonably offer them? Here there is a difficulty. When the right-wing paramilitaries showed interest in a political solution, agreeing to demobilise in return for lenient treatment of their crimes, many of those well-meaning outsiders promptly excoriated Mr Uribe for offering a sweetheart deal to drug-trafficking mass-murderers. Colombia's Supreme Court took a similar view. It put teeth into the law under which the paramilitaries disarmed, requiring them to give a full account of their crimes. But some of the warlords continued to run their criminal rackets while in jail. Last month Mr Uribe extradited 14 of them to the United States, where they face life in prison.
The tough line Colombia has taken with the right-wing warlords makes a peace deal with their left-wing counterparts harder. The FARC's leaders, too, have committed crimes against humanity, and some of them traffic drugs. So they now have little incentive to demobilise. Some Colombians say the best place for the FARC's leaders is jail. That is true, but the best can be the enemy of the good. Though the FARC can no longer destroy Colombia's democracy, fighting to the last guerrilla is in nobody's interest. Ending this conflict will require compromise as well as continued military firmness.
Forgiveness maybe, but no reward
Getting the compromise right will be difficult. It will almost certainly have to include security guarantees for the FARC's leaders. But it should not, as some say, include any offer of power-sharing. Colombia is a democracy. In return for laying down their arms and ending a pointless and destructive war, FARC soldiers should be encouraged to take part in politics, but on exactly the same terms as any other Colombian.
Master tactician or failing bungler?
Jun 12th 2008 CARACAS From The Economist print edition
AP
Latin America's self-styled Bolivarian hero may be losing his populist touch
Get article background
HUGO CHÁVEZ has never been one to worry about a little inconsistency. Venezuelans, along with their neighbours, have become accustomed to his habit of switching from firebrand to conciliator and back again, with barely a pause for breath. But even by his own remarkable standards, Venezuela's left-wing president has recently been showing new virtuosity in the art of making surprising U-turns.
In January this year he told a startled world that the FARC guerrillas in neighbouring Colombia should be treated not as terrorists, as they are by most countries, but as an “insurgent force”, with rights under the laws of war. On June 8th he surprised everyone again by calling on the same guerrillas to give up the struggle they had waged for four decades, release their 700 or so hostages and recognise that guerrilla warfare in Latin America “is history”.
In this latest reversal Mr Chávez is plainly doing his belated best to extract himself from an embarrassment. Computer files seized by Colombia during a raid on a FARC camp inside Ecuador two months ago appeared to confirm that Venezuela has been helping the guerrillas—and that Mr Chávez's call for an upgrading of the FARC's status was part of a strategy he had cooked up with its leaders.
At Colombia's behest, Interpol has inspected the computer drives and confirmed that they have not been tampered with. Venezuela says their content is fabricated: its government is mounting a propaganda offensive to convince the world of that. But the fact that many governments have been queuing up to ask Colombia whether their own intelligence services can see the files suggests that they believe the contents to be genuine. And although Colombia has its detractors in the region, most countries consider it bad manners to provide help to a guerrilla movement that is inflicting mayhem on its neighbour.
Even before the dent this affair has now put in his international reputation, Mr Chávez had troubles on the home front. In December voters narrowly rejected his proposal to rewrite Venezuela's 1999 constitution along “socialist” lines and include a measure that would provide for the indefinite re-election of the president. It was Mr Chávez's first significant electoral defeat after nearly a decade in power. Since then, he has sought to reintroduce elements of the rejected constitution, in part by using a far-reaching enabling law, passed last year, to legislate by decree.
But Venezuelan society has proven remarkably resistant. Teachers, parents and students have blocked the introduction of a politically inspired school curriculum and the abolition of university-entrance requirements. The private media forced a retreat on attempts to charge them exorbitant fees for material from a state-owned television channel. And a decree setting up a new intelligence-system, dubbed the “Gestapo law”, was repealed on June 10th, less than a fortnight after its introduction, following an outcry from human-rights groups. This would have obliged people to co-operate with intelligence agencies or face up to six years in jail.
Were Mr Chávez the all-powerful dictator some of his critics paint him as, he might well have ignored the protests. But despite his past as a failed coup-leader, he is constrained by the need to operate within the bounds of a democracy, albeit an imperfect one. On November 23rd he will face a fresh electoral test, when the country votes for new state governors and mayors.
Amidst an economic slowdown, annual inflation of around 30% and an unprecedented crime-wave, his prospects of avoiding another humiliating defeat look slim. A new drubbing at the polls would be likely to dash any hope of reviving his plan to evade the constitutional ban on his re-election in 2012. A reaffirmation of the expiry date of his presidency would, in its turn, fire the starting gun of the race to succeed him, thereby further undermining his authority.
Some pundits argue that the recent spate of U-turns simply reflects a populist president's desire to avoid alienating the electorate. The more conspiratorially minded believe that the introduction of unpalatable measures, followed by partial retreats, is a deliberate strategy. They suggest that Mr Chávez is seeking to unsettle the political climate to such an extent that he retains the option to suspend the November elections if the polls look adverse.
A simpler reason for Mr Chávez's many U-turns may be that he has a habit of making policy mistakes, which then require correction. A few months ago, for example, the government announced a series of measures to prevent the economy from overheating. But it overdid the course-correction. In the first quarter of this year, the annual growth rate slowed by around four points, to 4.8%, in comparison with the same period last year. On June 11th, in yet another about-turn, the president announced that some of the measures in the original package would be reversed.
Still, amid all the tactical confusion, Mr Chávez does not appear to have lost sight of his two main strategic goals: the installation of a “socialist revolution” in Venezuela and his own indefinite re-election. After his defeat in the December referendum, a huge billboard went up on a building not far from the presidential palace. “Por ahora” (“For now”), it read.
That should be a warning. His foes have learnt the hard way that it is dangerous to underestimate Mr Chávez. He is fond of citing the battle of Santa Inés, in the war for independence from Spain, when a feigned retreat led to victory. As November's election approaches, he is working hard to make sure that he holds on to as many as possible of the 20 states (out of a total of 24) that are currently in chavista hands. He has repeatedly told his followers that if important states were to fall to the opposition, his own future would be in doubt—even going so far as to suggest that in such an event “there would be war”. It is too soon to count him out.
Jun 12th 2008 CARACAS From The Economist print edition
AP
Latin America's self-styled Bolivarian hero may be losing his populist touch
Get article background
HUGO CHÁVEZ has never been one to worry about a little inconsistency. Venezuelans, along with their neighbours, have become accustomed to his habit of switching from firebrand to conciliator and back again, with barely a pause for breath. But even by his own remarkable standards, Venezuela's left-wing president has recently been showing new virtuosity in the art of making surprising U-turns.
In January this year he told a startled world that the FARC guerrillas in neighbouring Colombia should be treated not as terrorists, as they are by most countries, but as an “insurgent force”, with rights under the laws of war. On June 8th he surprised everyone again by calling on the same guerrillas to give up the struggle they had waged for four decades, release their 700 or so hostages and recognise that guerrilla warfare in Latin America “is history”.
In this latest reversal Mr Chávez is plainly doing his belated best to extract himself from an embarrassment. Computer files seized by Colombia during a raid on a FARC camp inside Ecuador two months ago appeared to confirm that Venezuela has been helping the guerrillas—and that Mr Chávez's call for an upgrading of the FARC's status was part of a strategy he had cooked up with its leaders.
At Colombia's behest, Interpol has inspected the computer drives and confirmed that they have not been tampered with. Venezuela says their content is fabricated: its government is mounting a propaganda offensive to convince the world of that. But the fact that many governments have been queuing up to ask Colombia whether their own intelligence services can see the files suggests that they believe the contents to be genuine. And although Colombia has its detractors in the region, most countries consider it bad manners to provide help to a guerrilla movement that is inflicting mayhem on its neighbour.
Even before the dent this affair has now put in his international reputation, Mr Chávez had troubles on the home front. In December voters narrowly rejected his proposal to rewrite Venezuela's 1999 constitution along “socialist” lines and include a measure that would provide for the indefinite re-election of the president. It was Mr Chávez's first significant electoral defeat after nearly a decade in power. Since then, he has sought to reintroduce elements of the rejected constitution, in part by using a far-reaching enabling law, passed last year, to legislate by decree.
But Venezuelan society has proven remarkably resistant. Teachers, parents and students have blocked the introduction of a politically inspired school curriculum and the abolition of university-entrance requirements. The private media forced a retreat on attempts to charge them exorbitant fees for material from a state-owned television channel. And a decree setting up a new intelligence-system, dubbed the “Gestapo law”, was repealed on June 10th, less than a fortnight after its introduction, following an outcry from human-rights groups. This would have obliged people to co-operate with intelligence agencies or face up to six years in jail.
Were Mr Chávez the all-powerful dictator some of his critics paint him as, he might well have ignored the protests. But despite his past as a failed coup-leader, he is constrained by the need to operate within the bounds of a democracy, albeit an imperfect one. On November 23rd he will face a fresh electoral test, when the country votes for new state governors and mayors.
Amidst an economic slowdown, annual inflation of around 30% and an unprecedented crime-wave, his prospects of avoiding another humiliating defeat look slim. A new drubbing at the polls would be likely to dash any hope of reviving his plan to evade the constitutional ban on his re-election in 2012. A reaffirmation of the expiry date of his presidency would, in its turn, fire the starting gun of the race to succeed him, thereby further undermining his authority.
Some pundits argue that the recent spate of U-turns simply reflects a populist president's desire to avoid alienating the electorate. The more conspiratorially minded believe that the introduction of unpalatable measures, followed by partial retreats, is a deliberate strategy. They suggest that Mr Chávez is seeking to unsettle the political climate to such an extent that he retains the option to suspend the November elections if the polls look adverse.
A simpler reason for Mr Chávez's many U-turns may be that he has a habit of making policy mistakes, which then require correction. A few months ago, for example, the government announced a series of measures to prevent the economy from overheating. But it overdid the course-correction. In the first quarter of this year, the annual growth rate slowed by around four points, to 4.8%, in comparison with the same period last year. On June 11th, in yet another about-turn, the president announced that some of the measures in the original package would be reversed.
Still, amid all the tactical confusion, Mr Chávez does not appear to have lost sight of his two main strategic goals: the installation of a “socialist revolution” in Venezuela and his own indefinite re-election. After his defeat in the December referendum, a huge billboard went up on a building not far from the presidential palace. “Por ahora” (“For now”), it read.
That should be a warning. His foes have learnt the hard way that it is dangerous to underestimate Mr Chávez. He is fond of citing the battle of Santa Inés, in the war for independence from Spain, when a feigned retreat led to victory. As November's election approaches, he is working hard to make sure that he holds on to as many as possible of the 20 states (out of a total of 24) that are currently in chavista hands. He has repeatedly told his followers that if important states were to fall to the opposition, his own future would be in doubt—even going so far as to suggest that in such an event “there would be war”. It is too soon to count him out.
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