Pope
John Paul II and the trouble with miracles/Lawrence Krauss is director of the Origins Project at Arizona State University. His latest book is A Universe from Nothing.
Los
Angeles Times |7/07/2013
No
testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such
a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it
endeavors to establish.
—David
Hume
Last
week the Vatican announced that a meeting of cardinals and bishops had ruled
that the late Pope John Paul II was responsible for a second miracle, and thus
the way was cleared for sainthood.
The
Congregation for the Causes of Saints decided he had cured a woman from Costa
Rica in 2011 after a panel of doctors apparently ruled that her recovery was
otherwise inexplicable.
There’s
the rub, of course. There are many medical results we do not understand.
Spontaneous remission of cancer, for example, occurs in a reliable but small
fraction of the population; no immediate explanation can be presented on a
case-by-case. basis.
Attributing
that lack of understanding to the intercession of a dead pope is a huge step,
and it illustrates a fundamental difference between “evidence” in religion and
“evidence” in science.
The
physicist Richard Feynman pointed out that in science, when we have an idea, we
try to prove it wrong as well as right. This is an essential feature of
scientific skepticism that helps us avoid the trap of interpreting accidental
coincidences as significant results.
In
every experiment, anomalies occur. We accept such randomness in science and
test to see if any purported exciting new result is statistically significant
before we then begin to examine it more carefully to see if we might be
misinterpreting something mundane as something exciting.
If,
on the other hand, one seeks out “testimony miracles,” there is a good chance
one will find them. This is because one is making a presumption that miracles
occur. More fundamentally, it ignores the advice of Hume, written long ago,
rephrased by Carl Sagan somewhat later in a punchier way as: “Extraordinary
claims require extraordinary evidence.”
Another
example from Sagan is more to the point here, perhaps. Consider the miraculous
apparitions of the Virgin Mary that were purported to have occurred at Lourdes,
France, in 1858. Since that time millions of pilgrims have visited Lourdes to
bathe in the waters and be cured. The Catholic Church keeps careful records on
such claimed cures, and more than 60, including cancer remissions, have been
ruled as otherwise inexplicable and thus miraculous.
The
problem, however, is that when one examines the spontaneous remission rates in
the general population from diseases such as cancer, the rate is actually
higher than that reported among the Lourdes pilgrims. (Sagan pointed this out,
but others have also compared medical reports and Lourdes reports.) Thus, if
you bathe in the Lourdes waters, you apparently have a smaller likelihood of
being spontaneously cured than others who have not.
However,
if you are one of the faithful and go to Lourdes, and later your disease goes
into remission, there is no way I, or anyone else, will be likely to convince
you it was just a coincidence.
If
that fact makes you feel safer, if it makes you feel that someone is watching
out for you, perhaps there is no real harm done. However, when a major
institution such as the Catholic Church is willing to attribute otherwise
unexplained events to miracles, it strains credulity so much as to encourage
skepticism about its other claims.
Ultimately
the acceptance of miracles — events where the laws of nature apparently break
down — are one example of a “God of the Gaps” argument that ultimately ends up
building tensions between science and religion. If inexplicable events are used
as evidence for God, what happens when later science comes along and provides a
natural explanation? When the gap goes away, where is the room left for God?
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