Agentes norteamericanos encubiertos de la Oficina de Fiscalización del Gobierno (GAO)lograron introducir un material radiactivo suficiente para fabricar dos artefactos nucleares en las cajuelas de dos vehículos y cruzaron las fronteras de México y Canadá en sitios en donde estaban ubicados detectores estacionarios.
Fue prueba de la seguridad en los puntos de ingreso al país realizada entre julio y diciembre del 2005.
Y aunque los equipos de detección de radiactividad sonaron sus alarmas, los investigadores pudieron pasar tras mostrar documentos falsificados a los funcionarios de aduanas. DE ahi que el Presidente Bushabla de la fragilidad de la frontera y de la oficina de aduanas.
"Esta operación demostró que la Comisión Reguladora Nuclear conserva una mentalidad ubicada antes del 11 de septiembre en un mundo posterior al 11 de septiembre y debe modernizar sus métodos"', dijo el senador republicano Norm Coleman el lunes en un comunicado, aludiendo a los ataques del 2001.
La comisión, que supervisa los reactores y materiales nucleares replicó al legislador.
Su vocero, David McIntyre, dijo que "la seguridad ha sido de importancia principal para nosotros en temas como los materiales y los generadores eléctricos desde el 11 de septiembre".
Rechazó la denuncia de la GAO, de que los investigadores cruzaron con material suficiente para fabricar dos bombas "sucias", que combinan material radiactivo y convencional."Fue el equivalente radiactivo de lo que hay en un detector de humo", dijo McIntyre.
Un subcomité de Seguridad Interior del Senado de EE UU, encabezado por Coleman, divulgó detalles de la investigación y dos informes de la GAO sobre detectores de radiación y seguridad de puntos de ingreso, que serán tema de audiencias en los próximos días.
La GAO también halló que la instalación de detectores de radiación consume más tiempo y dinero de lo que preveía el gobierno.
Dijo que el Departamento de Seguridad Nacional difícilmente cumpliría su objetivo de instalar 3,034 detectores en cruces de frontera, puertos, aeropuertos y oficinas de correos para septiembre del 2009 y que el costo superará lo previsto en $342 millones.
Si los agentes fronterizos no logran detener este tipo de cargamentos, el resultado podría ser catastrófico dice un editorial del periódico The New York Times del 29 de marzo: .
The New York Times, March 29, 2006
Editorial
Fake ID's at the Border Crossings
Editorial
Fake ID's at the Border Crossings
While federal officials have been scrambling to install enough radiation detectors to screen all cargo for dangerous nuclear materials, they have apparently left a glaring hole in this thin and spotty line of defense. Even when detectors signal the presence of a radioactive substance, border guards may be fooled into waving a shipment through based on fraudulent paperwork and glib talk by the drivers.
That disturbing lesson comes from a report issued this week by the Government Accountability Office, an investigative arm of Congress. Undercover testers put small amounts of cesium-137, a highly radioactive material, in the trunks of two vehicles and drove across the borders from Mexico and Canada at sites that had big stationary detectors.
The good news is that the detectors signaled the presence of radioactivity and that inspectors then questioned the undercover testers and subjected their vehicles to further inspection with hand-held devices. The bad news is that they allowed the shipments through anyway, apparently on the basis of counterfeit Nuclear Regulatory Commission documents, copied from the Internet, and fake shipping documents from a fictitious company.
The G.A.O. says the smuggled cesium was enough to make two "dirty bombs," which could contaminate an area and render it unusable for a long period. The N.R.C., on the other hand, says the amounts were far too small to worry about. Either way, it is disturbing that the guards let the shipments through. It is not clear whether the guards have gotten complacent in the wake of repeated false alarms triggered by natural radiation from bananas, ceramic tiles, fertilizer and other products, or were simply tricked by the phony documents. Red-faced officials insist that they will give border agents new tools to verify such documents shortly. The N.R.C. clearly needs to tighten its rules governing the purchase and security of small quantities of radioactive materials.
A dirty bomb uses ordinary explosives to disperse radioactive materials and contaminate the environment. An even greater, if less likely, threat would be posed by a real nuclear weapon or the fissile material to make one. Unfortunately, bomb-grade uranium is much harder to detect than cesium, and radioactive materials shielded by lead are much harder to detect than containers of cesium in cardboard boxes in vehicle trunks. The nation is far short of its goal to have radiation detectors at every portal. If border guards miss shipments of bombs or fissile material, the result could be catastrophic.
That disturbing lesson comes from a report issued this week by the Government Accountability Office, an investigative arm of Congress. Undercover testers put small amounts of cesium-137, a highly radioactive material, in the trunks of two vehicles and drove across the borders from Mexico and Canada at sites that had big stationary detectors.
The good news is that the detectors signaled the presence of radioactivity and that inspectors then questioned the undercover testers and subjected their vehicles to further inspection with hand-held devices. The bad news is that they allowed the shipments through anyway, apparently on the basis of counterfeit Nuclear Regulatory Commission documents, copied from the Internet, and fake shipping documents from a fictitious company.
The G.A.O. says the smuggled cesium was enough to make two "dirty bombs," which could contaminate an area and render it unusable for a long period. The N.R.C., on the other hand, says the amounts were far too small to worry about. Either way, it is disturbing that the guards let the shipments through. It is not clear whether the guards have gotten complacent in the wake of repeated false alarms triggered by natural radiation from bananas, ceramic tiles, fertilizer and other products, or were simply tricked by the phony documents. Red-faced officials insist that they will give border agents new tools to verify such documents shortly. The N.R.C. clearly needs to tighten its rules governing the purchase and security of small quantities of radioactive materials.
A dirty bomb uses ordinary explosives to disperse radioactive materials and contaminate the environment. An even greater, if less likely, threat would be posed by a real nuclear weapon or the fissile material to make one. Unfortunately, bomb-grade uranium is much harder to detect than cesium, and radioactive materials shielded by lead are much harder to detect than containers of cesium in cardboard boxes in vehicle trunks. The nation is far short of its goal to have radiation detectors at every portal. If border guards miss shipments of bombs or fissile material, the result could be catastrophic.
