15 dic 2008

El profesor Marx

(Carlos ) Marx, de vuelta/Reyes Mate, profesor de investigación del CSIC
Publicado en EL PERIÓDICO, 13/12/08;
Marx ha vuelto, de momento, a las librerías. Se reeditan los textos más políticos, salen del almacén ejemplares empolvados de El Capital y los escritores que husmean la dirección del viento llenan páginas preguntándose ¿qué Marx vuelve?
No el que se fue por la puerta trasera de la historia disfrazado de comunista, revisionista, luxemburguista o gramsciano. Durante un siglo la humanidad ha tenido tiempo de experimentar con alguna de esas fórmulas cómo vencer al capitalismo, y no ha habido manera. La caí- da del muro de Berlín dio caza al fantasma que recorría Europa, ese comunismo tras el que, como dice el Manifiesto comunista, corrían “el papa y el zar, Metternich y Guizot, radicales franceses y policías alemanes”: es decir, todos los poderes fácticos. Se han cobrado la pieza y los manifestantes andan disueltos.
NO VUELVE un Marx alternativo, sino otro mucho más cercano a nuestros propios demonios, alguien capaz de decir en este momento una palabra verdadera sobre la crisis que nos invade. Esa palabra no es fácil de pronunciar. Estamos asistiendo al sorprendente espectáculo de que hablan los que tienen que callar y callan los que deberían hablar. Hablan, en efecto, políticos muy viajados, economistas de prestigio o dirigentes mundiales que desde sus puestos de mando no se han enterado de por dónde venía el peligro y que ahora nos abroncan por no poder pagar una hipoteca que ellos nos pusieron en la mano. O son unos incompetentes, por no saber, o si sabían y callaron, unos desalmados. Debe- rían callarse y dejar el espacio libre para que hablen quienes nacieron como alternativa al capitalismo. Son estos los hijos, sobrinos o nietos de Marx, esos mismos que no supieron dar con la fórmula alternativa y por eso no dicen nada. Ese marxismo ambicioso no vuelve.
Vuelve, sí, el Marx que fue capaz de ver como nadie las tripas del capitalismo y que como todos nosotros quedó fascinado por la vida burguesa y por el poder creador/destructor del capitalismo. Al autor de El Capital debemos el haber descubierto la relación entre economía y política, por tanto, que la economía debe estar dirigida desde la política, una tarea hercúlea y a contracorriente porque “el modo de producción de la vida material domina en general el desarrollo de la vida social, política e intelectual”, es decir, que el dinero tiende a convertirse en poder. Suya es también la idea de que en la fábrica hay algo más que el dinero y la voluntad del patrón, a saber: el capital del amo, el trabajo de los obreros y la confianza de los compradores. También nos transmitió la idea de crisis periódica. La producción tiene que ser competitiva, de ahí la necesidad de revolucionar los sistemas de producción y de reducir costes salariales. Al debilitarse la capacidad adquisitiva del trabajador, aumentan los estocs de mercancías, con toda la secuencia que tan bien conocemos.
En diseccionar al monstruo, Marx es incomparable. A él eso no le bastaba. Quería darle cumplida réplica ofreciendo un plan alternativo. Tuvo entonces que echar mano de previsiones o profecías que no se han cumplido. Eso lo damos por descontado. Lo que ahora nos fascina es leer sus críticas al capitalismo no en el contexto de una estrategia alternativa, sino como la cara de una moneda cuya cruz es la fascinación por ese mismo capitalismo. En el citado Manifiesto, Marx mete el estilete en las entraña del sistema –”la burguesía ha ahogado en la aguas heladas del cálculo egoísta los estertores sagrados de la piedad feudal. Redujo la dignidad personal al valor de cambio, y en lugar de las muchas libertades duramente conquistadas colocó la única e indiferente libertad del comercio”– para decir a continuación que “la burguesía ha jugado en la historia un papel eminentemente revolucionario; esta conmoción constante de la producción, esta permanente sacudida de todo el sistema social, esta agitación y constante provisionalidad es lo que distingue a la época burguesa de todas las anteriores”. No se sabe qué admirar más, si la radicalidad de la crítica o el entusiasmo, rayano en la apología, del crítico por el capitalismo.
NO ES MÁS próximo ese Marx. Con él somos conscientes del peligro de un sistema que envenena las aguas, contamina el aire y desertiza la tierra. Y como él vivimos seducidos por un modo de vida gratificante para quien lo disfruta, con el excitante añadido de poner a prueba cada día la capacidad revolucionaria de nuestros conocimientos científicos. Incluso nos resulta cercano el Marx histórico –el Moro, como le motejaban en su tiempo– escindido entre el trabajo teórico realmente visionario y la lucha por la existencia, por cómo llegar a final de mes. Lo que ahora nos dicen sus intérpretes es que nunca se propuso acabar con el sistema, tan solo hacerle coherente y racional. Quien en todo caso se enfrente críticamente al capitalismo no podrá pasar de Marx, pues, como dice otro Marx, el obispo de Múnich, en su libro también titulado El Capital, “Carlos Marx no está muerto y hay que tomarle en serio”.

Out of Sight

Out of Sight/By Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer and a fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies
THE NEW YORK TIMES, 14/12/08;
Few post-9/11 issues have produced more anxiety and revulsion than the Central Intelligence Agency’s use of “aggressive interrogation” and the extrajudicial rendition of terrorist suspects to countries that practice torture. President-elect Barack Obama has promised to ban waterboarding and other pain-inflicting soliciting techniques, as well as rendition. He has also promised to close the Guantánamo Bay prison.
More broadly, liberal Democrats in Congress intend to deploy a more moral counterterrorism,
where the ends — stopping the slaughter of civilians by Islamic holy warriors — no longer justifies reprehensible means. Winning the hearts and minds of foreigners by remaining true to our nobler virtues is now seen as the way to defeat our enemies while preserving our essential goodness.
Sounds uplifting. Don’t bet on it happening.
Mr. Obama will soon face the same awful choices that confronted George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, and he could well be forced to accept a central feature of their anti-terrorist methods: extraordinary rendition. If the choice is between non-deniable aggressive questioning conducted by Americans and deniable torturous interrogations by foreigners acting on behalf of the United States, it is almost certain that as president Mr. Obama will choose the latter.
Of course, he and his senior officials seem to believe now that they don’t have to make this choice. For them there is a better way to combat terrorism, by using physically non-coercive questioning of suspects and civilian courts or military courts-martial to try and punish jihadists.
But this third way, which is essentially where America was before the Clinton administration embraced rendition, is plausible only if Mr. Obama is lucky. He might be. If there is no “ticking time bomb” situation — say, where waterboarding a future Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (the 9/11 mastermind) could save thousands of civilians — then there is neither need for the C.I.A.’s exceptional methods, nor the harsh services of Jordan’s General Intelligence Department.
And there are signs that Mr. Obama won’t have to confront such a situation. Through American and allied efforts, Al Qaeda has sustained enormous damage since 9/11. Osama bin Laden’s decisive battle in Iraq, where Al Qaeda intended to re-energize its holy war against the Americans among the Arabs, has turned into a military and moral disaster. Arab Muslim fundamentalists have finally started the great debate as to whether it is, in fact, unacceptable to kill believers and nonbelievers in jihad.
And the internal-security services of our allies in Europe are, on the whole, vastly better today than they were in 2001. Thanks to intrusive surveillance methods (many of which are outlawed in the United States), they are much more efficient in pre-empting the plots of holy warriors traversing their borders.
However, troubles in Pakistan may well reverse Mr. Obama’s luck. He has said he intends to be hawkish about fighting Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Central Asia. So, let us suppose that he increases the number of Special Forces raids into Pakistan, and those soldiers capture members of Al Qaeda and their computers, and learn that the group has advanced plans for striking American and European targets, but we don’t know specifically where or when.
What would Mr. Obama do? After all, if we’d gotten our hands on a senior member of Al Qaeda before 9/11, and knew that an attack likely to kill thousands of Americans was imminent, wouldn’t waterboarding, or taking advantage of the skills of our Jordanian friends, have been the sensible, moral thing to do with a holy warrior who didn’t fear death but might have feared pain?
Mr. Obama will probably not have the option of ordering the C.I.A. to aggressively interrogate another member of Al Qaeda — not after running a campaign that highlighted the moral failings of President Bush. To get the C.I.A. back in the interrogation business would probably require a liberal Democratic Congress to pass laws guaranteeing case officers’ immunity from criminal and civil prosecution. This seems unlikely — unless, of course, the United States is again devastated by a terrorist strike.
And because of Mr. Obama’s plan to close Guantánamo, the Justice Department is already going to have to figure out how to move, try, punish and release its detainees. Thus the last thing in the world the Obama administration will want is to bring in more “enemy combatants” from the Central Asian battlefield.
Which brings us back to rendition, which, properly understood, is what Americans do when they realize that active counterterrorism against jihadists prepared to use mass-casualty weapons is an ethical, juridical and operational tar pit. It isn’t an ideal solution — American intelligence officers have no control of the questioning, and Washington can become beholden to foreign security services — but it’s a satisfactory compromise. Just ask Samuel R. Berger, the national-security adviser for President Bill Clinton, who no doubt worked through all the pitfalls when he first approved extrajudicial rendition.
In addition, the C.I.A. is able to guard the secrecy of foreign-liaison operations more effectively, especially from Congressional prying, than it can its own activities. It has also certainly paid close attention to how the press tracked some of its clandestine international flights carrying terrorism suspects after 9/11, and will in the future undoubtedly make it much harder to sleuth out who is going where.
A dense bipartisan moral fog surrounds rendition. Former senior Clinton officials can still deny that they sent anyone away in order that he be tortured. Few are as honest and frank as Walt Slocombe, a Clinton undersecretary of defense who once remarked that the difference between Democratic and Republican rendition was that Democrats “drilled air holes in the boxes.”
If Mr. Obama’s Democrats get blown back into the ugly world that we live in, and resume rendition (and, of course, fib about it), then President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, who have been vilified for besmirching America’s honor, may at least take some consolation in knowing that hypocrisy is always the homage vice pays to virtue.

Big Brother

Big Brother Hasn´t Won/By Patrick Radden Keefe, a fellow at the Century Foundation and the author of Chatter: Uncovering the Echelon Surveillance Network and the Secret World of Global Eavesdropping
THE NEW YORK TIMES, 14/12/08;
If you thought the wiretapping controversy ended last summer, when Congress blessed the Bush administration’s warrantless-wiretapping program by passing a new surveillance law that greatly enhanced the powers of the National Security Agency, think again. The legacy of the illegal operation represents a serious problem for the Obama administration.
After a contentious hearing this month on the most controversial aspect of the new law — a blanket grant of immunity to the telecom giants like AT&T that secretly permitted the N.S.A. to siphon off their customers’ communications — a federal judge in San Francisco must decide whether Congress has the authority to bestow absolution on private companies that appear to have violated the law. One paradox is that Bush administration lawyers have claimed from the outset that the surveillance program was entirely legal, yet they remain desperate to prevent any court from testing that claim. Instead, they are in the odd position of advocating immunity for something that they insist is not a crime.
Another paradox, which Barack Obama surely appreciates, is that the real issue underlying the immunity debate is not whether the telecoms should pay damages; it is whether lawsuits against the companies can be used to answer a question that Congress and the press have not: Just how bad was the N.S.A. program, after all?
Mr. Obama says he does not want his first term to become bogged down in any sort of “partisan witch hunt.” Indeed, the sheer extent of executive lawlessness in Washington over the past eight years has left so many wrongs to right that, in the interests of triage, the new president may choose to let bygones be bygones where wiretapping is concerned.
But that would be a mistake. From 2001 to 2007, the United States government violated one of the signature prohibitions of the post-Watergate era by turning its formidable eavesdropping apparatus on its own citizens. The new law last summer resolved matters only by moving the goalpost, so that many of the N.S.A.’s more questionable activities simply became legal. But major questions remain about the legal grounds used to justify the program, and about how many innocent Americans were ensnared.
The Obama administration cannot enact the kind of thorough course correction on domestic surveillance that is needed without understanding how far off course the intelligence community got in the first place. Mr. Obama, who initially vowed to filibuster the immunity provision but, under pressure in the race against John McCain, backed down and reluctantly supported it, has committed “to have my attorney general conduct a comprehensive review” of N.S.A. surveillance.
That is a promising first step, but it is not enough. Nor is the prospect of reports due next summer from the inspectors general of the N.S.A. and the Justice Department. The good news for Mr. Obama, politically, is that the executive branch should not lead the charge in investigating the wiretapping. Congress should.
Provided that the Obama administration is willing to cooperate rather than stonewall in the Bush fashion, Congress can get to the bottom of the abuses while simultaneously reasserting itself as a coequal branch of government. To the extent possible, the hearings should be public, and if necessary, investigators should grant immunity to witnesses in exchange for candid testimony; this is no witch hunt, but an effort to establish an accurate historical record.
What details can actually be aired in public without violating national security? The number of Americans listened to and the broad contours of the program, for a start. For example, in March 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft threatened to resign over the program, backing down only when it was adjusted. What transgression was so appalling that it made John Ashcroft look like a civil libertarian? We still don’t know.
Even the legal opinions governing the program are still squirreled away in a safe in Vice President Dick Cheney’s office. In recent months, the Senate Judiciary Committee and a Washington district judge have ordered them turned over, and the next attorney general should do so immediately.
Without some baseline understanding of what went wrong — and how wrong — in recent years, and without the establishment of some bright line rules of the road, it would be naïve to think that there won’t be future abuses. For aggressive intelligence agencies, legal ambiguity is an invitation to excess.
Wiretapping can sometimes seem forbiddingly complex, and many Americans just aren’t concerned that the government might monitor their calls. But what is at stake here is not mere personal privacy, but the bedrock American principles of separation of powers and the rule of law.
Jack Goldsmith, a former top Bush administration lawyer, pronounced the wiretapping program “the biggest legal mess” he had seen in his life. That sort of mess cannot simply be swept under the rug; it must be cleared up.

The CIA

Intelligence Boosters/By Art Brown, a 25-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency and the head of the Asia division of the agency’s clandestine service from 2003 to 2005
THE NEW YORK TIMES, 14/12/08;
This is the article I never intended to write. For former C.I.A. officers, the tipping point between debate-generating critique and “if they had only listened to me” pontification is easy to cross, and I had hoped to avoid the latter by simply refraining from attempts at the former. So let’s be clear, I am not claiming to have been prescient. It took more than three years outside the agency for me to truly understand its problems and to see a possible solution.
To start with the bottom line, the C.I.A.’s human spy business is not answering the hardest questions. How can I know this, three years out of touch with the secret stuff? The answer is rather simple: because Osama bin Laden is still the head of Al Qaeda. And no one has been held accountable for failing to catch him.
By the evening of Sept. 11, 2001, every serving C.I.A. officer — indeed, every American — knew that the agency had one prime mission: “Get him!” But, after more than seven years and billions of dollars, we have failed. I recognize much has been done to damage Al Qaeda’s networks but, make no mistake, no amount of “rendition” of bin Laden lieutenants can mask our failure to bring to justice the man who ordered 9/11.
There are other failures too, less dramatic perhaps but of even greater consequence. The clandestine creep of nuclear know-how threatens to put the worst weapons into the worst hands. If North Korea or Iran, or Shangri-La for that matter, claims the right to develop a nuclear fist, our intelligence services should know every detail about that program. Yet we collectively fail over and over again when North Korea tests a missile or nuclear reactor construction in the eastern Syrian desert come as a surprise. If the C.I.A.’s human spy arm was operating as a private business, it would be running at a loss. Think Detroit, not 007.
Why? First, the agency is simply too insular. It does not sufficiently tap into the expertise that exists across the breadth of America. The human spy components of the C.I.A. live in a cocoon of secrecy that breeds distrust of outsiders. This is one reason very few officers have BlackBerrys, and those few who do usually leave them in their cars when they go to work. Despite their reputation as plugged-in experts on other countries, many C.I.A. officers do not even have Internet access at their desks. Worse yet, they don’t think they need it.
Second, the C.I.A. has a terrible problem with quality control. When I was still there, for example, C.I.A. spies reported on several occasions that Al Qaeda had plans to attack American military bases overseas — in countries that a quick Web search would have shown had no such bases. Quantity outweighed quality as folks in the spy business focused not on accuracy or impact, but on increasing amounts of product.
And that brings us to perhaps the most numbing factor, the lack of performance accountability. In my years in the agency, I cannot recall a single case where anyone was fired for failing to perform. I cannot even remember anyone being demoted. There is simply no job-threatening penalty for mediocrity. Think of this on Jan. 20, when we’re likely to see Osama bin Laden sending an inauguration greeting to the new president.
So let me float a proposal borrowed from the business world. If you want to find answers to the hardest questions, why not reach broadly into the expertise of the country and assemble the best spy team possible?
On Shangri-La’s nuclear ambitions, it would probably mean including a few engineers who build our own bombs. They could make sure you understand the missing parts of the puzzle and how those parts may be hidden. You’d also want successful entrepreneurs — both American and allied — who know how to make deals in Shangri-La and can point you to others who deal there more often.
It goes further. Good freelance reporters know how to find sources to fill in a hard story. The expertise of academia, where decades of insight often go untouched, could be balanced with a seasoned detective or tough prosecutor adept at turning a crook. The more military the topic, the more military folks you would want on its pursuit. The spy business simply isn’t that difficult, and the sleight-of-hand techniques of the trade, some reaching back to Joshua’s spies at Jericho, can be fairly quickly learned. It is creativity, judgment and the ability to reach a goal on time that are hard to teach.
The agency would not lure these outside experts with a career or give them ranks or titles. That only breeds the ladder-climbing trap that sees newly minted C.I.A. managers, six months into their assignments, planning how they might climb that next rung. Rather, the agency could compile teams of accomplished Americans for a fixed period of service and then let them return to their respective fields. (Much of the work could be done over the Internet, allowing some of them to keep their day jobs.) Their incentive would be the chance to make a real difference, with maybe a decent payment at the end if the project is a success.
Yes, there are some obstacles here. Using “normal” citizens in a covert role could require giving them legal protections that may not exist right now. Getting consensus among policymakers and Congress, and isolating the hard questions from the headlines of the day, will be a difficult challenge. And, more insidiously, wounded institutional pride at the C.I.A. could generate bureaucratic knife-fighting by employees who would rather see the quest fail than give credit to “amateur” operators. The safe bet is that none of this will ever happen.
But is it not worth trying? It would certainly be worth breaking some existing rules if we could really assemble a better spying apparatus from the best parts America has to offer. When it comes to the hard stuff, we couldn’t do much worse.

Terrorism

"Terror" Is the Enemy/By Philip Bobbitt, a law professor at Columbia and the author of Terror and Consent: The Wars for the 21st Century. He is also a former senior director at the National Security Council (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 14/12/08):
Generals are not the only ones who prepare to fight the previous war. Our experience with 20th-century nation-based terrorists — the I.R.A. in Ireland, the P.K.K. in the Kurdish areas of Turkey, ETA in Spain’s Basque country, the F.L.N. in Algeria and others — still dominates much of our thinking about how to deal with 21st-century global terrorists. Indeed, the lack of new concepts may well be as deadly to our national security as any lack of vaccines.
New approaches to dealing with global terrorism must first be integrated into our foreign security policies generally. Allies in Europe must be reassured that the United States will not violate the human rights accords to which we are a party. We must also devise a policy that aligns the interests of Afghanistan, India and Pakistan while isolating the terrorists that threaten them all. We must seek common ground with many states around the world against our universal threats — global terrorists and pirates, the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons and civilian catastrophes — even if, in other contexts, these nations are our adversaries.
The “war on terror” is not a nonsensical public relations slogan, however unwelcome this conclusion may be to Pentagon planners or civil-liberties advocates. The notion of such a war puzzles us — after all, who would sign the peace treaty? — because we are so trapped in 20th-century expectations about warfare. But success in war does not always mean the capitulation of an enemy government (as we have seen in Iraq); rather, it varies with the war aim.
In a war against terror, the aim is not the conquest of territory or the advancement of ideology, but the protection of civilians. We are fighting a war on terror, not just terrorists. That is evident from the list of targets in the attacks in Mumbai, India, in which national liberation terrorists from Kashmir were apparently the outsourced operational arm of a global network with far more ambitious, and more anti-Western, objectives. The Mumbai terrorists did not even bother to issue demands; what they sought was terror itself.
Mexico is potentially our Pakistan — a failing state on our border that can provide haven for our adversaries, at least some of whom will be privatized terrorists. Imagine a poorer, less-democratic Mexico; then imagine it harboring extortionists with a small arsenal of deliverable nuclear or biological weapons. This may be a long-term threat, but it requires immediate assistance and cooperation.
But Pakistan is our Pakistan, too, and not just India’s or Afghanistan’s problem. “Homeland security” is a dangerous solecism when we are fighting a global adversary that moves easily across borders. If terror is our adversary, then our own health system, for example, is only as secure as the most vulnerable health system overseas that might spawn an epidemic that could quickly reach our shores.
We must use available international institutions — like the International Criminal Court, to which pirates and other terrorists could be rendered — whenever possible. Yet we must not shrink from augmenting them, for example, by creating a global body similar to NATO including other democracies, by enlarging the United Nations Security Council to include other great states, and by giving new security responsibilities to the Group of Eight.
Our legislators need more foresight, stockpiling laws for emergencies just as we stockpile vaccines. Perhaps the most obvious would be a provision to replace members of Congress who might be killed or disabled in such numbers that the House of Representatives itself is unable to act. This could easily have occurred on 9/11 if the fourth plane had struck the Capitol, which would have plunged the country into months of martial law.
Finally, the Obama administration can have no higher priority than forging links with the private sector to protect what has become the electronic foundation for contemporary life. Unless the government, perhaps through insurance mandates, can persuade private companies to harden themselves to cyber-attacks, the deregulated and fragmented owners of our digital backbone will inevitably underfinance such protection.
This last observation points to the interrelation between the three arenas of the war on terror: 21st-century terrorists, the commodification of weapons of mass destruction, and the increasing vulnerability of highly developed nations like our own. Educating our public about this new tripartite threat will place enormous demands on our political leadership.
The presidential election was the end of the first phase of the war on terror. Preventing any attacks on the United States since 9/11 is something for which the Bush administration must be given credit, but credit must also go to the American public, which decisively rejected offshore penal colonies, spurious rationalizations for warfare, secret torture chambers and contempt for the constitutional and international laws that would forbid such practices. Indeed, by selecting a former law professor as its new president, the country has thoroughly dismissed the notion that law is an obstacle rather than a guide to achieving security.

De imágenes y comunicados/Raymundo Riva Palacio

Estrictamente Personal De imágenes y comunicados/Raymundo Riva Palacio El Financiero, noviembre 19, 2026 | La presidenta Claudia Sheinbaum h...