Zelensky’s Fight After the War/

 Zelensky’s Fight After the War/  Henry E. Hale y Olga Onuch 

Henry E. Hale is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University. He is the author of Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. Olga Onuch is Professor in Comparative Politics at the University of Manchester. She is the author of Mapping Mass Mobilization: Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Argentina and Ukraine. They are the authors of The Zelensky Effect (Oxford University Press, 2023), from which this essay is adapted.

Foreign Affairs, 04/Jul/2023

Russia’s war against Ukraine has transformed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s image. Before Russia launched its full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, many regarded him as an untested figure whose former career as an actor and comedian did not inspire much confidence. After it began, however, he became—in former U.S. President George W. Bush’s judgment—“the Winston Churchill of our time”.

In the war’s first days, many Western observers assumed that Zelensky would buckle, flee, surrender, or die. Instead, he stayed in Kyiv and led Ukraine with resolve. His popularity skyrocketed. A July 2022 poll conducted by the authors and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that 65 percent of people in unoccupied Ukraine believed Zelensky to be the best man to lead the country to victory. The second most popular choice, former president Petro Poroshenko, had the support of five percent. Another 19 percent either said there was no difference between the politicians or declined to answer. More than 80 percent of respondents described Zelensky as intelligent, strong, and honest.

But when the war finally ends, Zelensky will face major challenges. Wartime leadership requires very different skills and capacities than does leadership during peacetime. Notably, Ukrainians are less confident in Zelensky’s leadership when they are asked to consider the future. In the same July 2022 poll, 55 percent identified Zelensky as the best person to lead the country’s postwar reconstruction, and the share saying there was no difference between him and the alternatives or that refused to answer was 28 percent. To overcome these potential misgivings, Zelensky will have to rebuild and fortify not only Ukraine’s cities and infrastructure but also its democracy. He will have to end the country’s tendency to shape government around personal patronage networks, which are prone to corruption, and craft an inclusive conception of patriotism. He will also need to respect the rules and the spirit of the Ukrainian constitution. Zelensky’s ability to meet these challenges will determine his country’s fate and the future of its democracy.

THE TEMPTATION OF POWER

The Russian invasion rallied Ukraine’s vibrant, inclusive civic nation and strengthened an associated sense of duty and commitment to democracy. Data collected in February 2023 by the MOBILISE Project, showed that approximately 80 percent of Ukraine’s civilian population is involved in the war, through volunteering, protest action, or giving financial support. Others are putting partisan differences aside, uniting in support of the reforms that will be required by EU accession. These positive developments are threatened by Ukraine’s long-standing tradition of what is known as patronalism, which is the feeling that personal connections are necessary to get almost anything done, feeding distrust in the rule of law. This reliance on patrons cultivates deep personal connections among those in one’s own network, but it also spawns nepotism, reliance on bribes, and often violence when trust breaks down. Those in power have repeatedly taken advantage of this situation to create their own political machines that accumulate wealth and suppress opposition. Although the people have repeatedly risen up to thwart Ukraine’s most notorious power grabs, the country’s political class is still prone to corruption and the tendency to favor personal connections over democratic institutions. As long as there is a perception that “everybody does it”, these practices are likely to continue.

It is possible that the sense of unity the war sparked may dissipate when it ends. Of course, the Ukrainian government could replace it with a new sense of national purpose provided by Ukraine’s application to join the EU, which will give new impetus to much-needed reforms. But these reforms could generate enough opposition to drive the country back toward patronalism. EU membership, for example, will require a major adjustment for Ukraine’s businesses, for they will have to become aligned with EU regulations. It will also oblige Kyiv to take steps to eliminate corruption, necessitating extensive reforms of the Ukrainian judicial system. These reforms will put pressure on both ordinary citizens and elites, challenging the latter’s vested interests. Opposition from ordinary people whose businesses will be affected, and from elites whose interests will be threatened, is likely. Thus, the dangers of a return to patronal politics as usual are real. It cannot be guaranteed that the democratic gains the country has made will be sustained. It is possible, although not highly probable, that Ukraine may shift from the patronal democracy it has typically been in recent years—in which a significant amount of corruption has been leavened by a general commitment to democratic transfers of power when incumbents lose elections—to a more authoritarian or centralized system.

When wider political opposition to Zelensky’s government reemerges, as it is likely to do once the war ends, it is possible that Zelensky and his supporters may be tempted to protect their leadership by amassing power for themselves—even if the initial aim is only to push through reforms or rebuild the country. Such justifications have been used by leaders seeking to strengthen their rule in eastern Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere time and again. This kind of ramped-up “presidentialism” could set in motion processes that might undermine reforms. Already, some of Zelensky’s critics have interpreted his removal of the mayor of Chernihiv, Vladyslav Atroshenko, on abuse-of-office charges as a threat to local government. The same critics have charged that the Zelensky administration’s weakening of the country’s oligarchs masks an effort to gain this power for itself. And while it is too early to tell whether this interpretation of his moves is well grounded, the possibility must nonetheless be guarded against.

Some of the actions that Zelensky’s government has taken to prosecute the war could also threaten Ukrainian democracy when peace is restored. For example, the February 2022 decision to consolidate most private television channels into a single state broadcaster was arguably necessary at the start of the war as the country struggled for survival. Such an action would be unjustifiable in peacetime. Zelensky’s critics in parliament—the leaders of the European Solidarity party in particular—as well as think tanks and NGOs such as Opora, Chesno, and the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, have publicly and privately voiced concerns that the president may be unwilling to give up this control when the war ends. No leader, after all, relishes being criticized or—as they see it—vigorously attacked and ridiculed, as happens in open societies. But if Ukraine is to continue to deepen its already vibrant democracy, these measures will have to be reversed when the war ends and the threat of Russian aggression is gone.

It is also possible that Zelensky’s far-reaching popularity itself could pose a threat to Ukrainian democracy. There is no one in Ukraine who has anything close to his stature and public support as a political leader. If this level of popularity is sustained, it could lead Zelensky to conclude that he needs to stay in power, effectively denying others the chance to gain the needed stature. Perhaps the greatest thing that U.S. President George Washington ever did, greater even than leading his forces to victory in the Revolutionary War, was to step away from the presidency at a time when he was still revered as a war hero and was far and away the country’s most prominent leader. He thereby set a precedent for the peaceful transfer of power. Shortly before being elected in 2019, Zelensky declared that a president should only serve a single five-year term. A strong case can be made that breaking this particular promise would not harm Ukrainian democracy, and could even bring stability in wartime. But if Zelensky wins re-election, the future trajectory of Ukrainian democracy may come to depend on whether he will abide by the country’s two-term limit. There is currently no indication that he would consider violating it.

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE NATIONALISM

The rise of civic national identity in Ukraine, an identity that places civic duty and attachment to the country above all else, is one of the great achievements of Ukrainian independence. This identity has been elevated and nurtured by Zelensky and consolidated by the war. Nevertheless, it has been consistently challenged by other visions of what it means to be a Ukrainian. One extreme alternative vision connects national identity solely to ethnocultural identity, according to which the concept of being a good and reliable citizen depends on speaking the right language, holding the right view of the country’s history, and revering the right cultural figures. To adherents of this view, those who do not share these ethnocultural traits are often regarded as a threat. The more nationalist proponents of this exclusive ethnocultural identity are a small minority. And those who could be considered liberal nationalists but who still promote a more ethnoculturally flavored patriotism in parliament, such as those in the European Solidarity party, are quick also to highlight the importance of civic national duty and the centrality of the state. In fact, for most politicians, even right-wing ones, civic and ethnocultural identities can be complementary much as they are in France.

Nonetheless, some politicians may seek political gain by capitalizing on or seeking to exacerbate these divides. There are many historical examples of countries that have been traumatized by brutal wars resorting to more exclusive definitions of the nation in an effort to wall off foreign influence. This happened among some of Ukraine’s western neighbors following World War II and the fall of communism. Such moves can lead to division, oppression, and internal conflict, weakening the country and opening up opportunities for exploitation. In Ukraine’s case, the risk, albeit very small, is that an illiberal nationalist movement can gain renewed support and push for the hardening of more extreme views of Ukrainian identity, according to which true national security and prosperity can only be achieved through some kind of ethnic purification.

Fortunately, there is no indication so far that such exclusivist forms of nationalism are gathering force. Rather, the war seems to have strengthened Ukrainians’ commitment to liberalism and to inclusive ideas of the nation. This has happened even as a strong grassroots shift has occurred toward speaking Ukrainian (many people in Ukraine speak Ukrainian and Russian). Indeed, bilingual citizens are increasingly distancing themselves from other “Russian” aspects of their identities. In fact, there is some evidence this shift is particularly pronounced among southeastern Russophone Ukrainians who are seeing this shift to Ukrainian language practice as an element of their civic duty to the state.

It will be essential for the Ukrainian government to sustain broad national unity as it pursues reform efforts, and Ukrainian reformers can look cautiously to Georgia for inspiration. In 2003, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili successfully capitalized on the optimism generated by the Rose Revolution to immediately and dramatically eliminate petty corruption throughout the government, including in the previously notorious traffic police as well as basic state services. Saakashvili’s brilliance was not so much to propose a technically impressive anticorruption plan as to convince millions that things would actually change, thereby setting in motion a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Of course, Georgia’s history is also a cautionary tale, with other, high-level corrupt practices continuing. Ukraine needs an even more far-reaching reform effort. What Georgia shows, though, is that it is only when people are convinced that change is coming that they will alter their own behavior and adapt to the new expected reality. Formulating attractive proposals is relatively easy; convincing people that things will change is much more difficult.

The end of the war, whenever it comes, may offer Zelensky and the rest of the country just such a moment. The president will need to find a way to translate the population’s will to fight into an equally strong conviction that the old approach to running the country is no longer possible. And he must then follow through on his promises. The moment will come, and it must be hoped that he lives up to it.